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INTRODUCTION

In 2013, the South Carolina Supreme Court addressed the question of
whether the judiciary can exercise jurisdiction over an ethics complaint against a
member of the General Assembly.I Although the court dismissed the case,
holding that the General Assembly has exclusive jurisdiction over such
complaints,2 the court also brought up the issue of separation of powers.3 The
separation of powers discussion which was arguably necessary to resolve the
issues in the case 4-later sparked a controversy over the South Carolina State
Ethics Commission (State Ethics Commission or Ethics Commission), an entity
independent of the General Assembly that has jurisdiction over members of the
General Assembly in the same types of ethics complaints.'
Currently, the State Ethics Commission has no jurisdiction over the General
Assembly. 6 As of 2012, more than twenty years had passed since the South

1. See Rainey v. Haley, 404 S.C. 320, 325, 745 S.E.2d 81, 83 (2013).
2.
Id.
3.
Id. at 327, 745 S.E.2d at 84.
4.
See Cindy Scoppe, What Rainey v. Haley Tells Us About Ethics Reform, THE STATE,
June 18, 2013, at A9, available at http//www.thestate.com/2013/06/18/2823361 /scoppe-what-rainev-haley-tells.html (stating that the justices "gratuitously invoke[d] the constitution").
5. See Adam Beam, State House for Sale: SC Ethics Laws a Muddled Mess, THE STATE,
Oct. 6, 2013, at BI, available at http://www.thestate.com/2013/10/06/3021740/exclusive-sc-ethicslaw-a-muddled.html.
6.

South Carolina is one of only six states in which the state ethics commission has no

jurisdiction over the state legislature. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-13-320 (Supp. 2013); IND. CODE
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Carolina General Assembly addressed comprehensive ethics reform.
In
response to this inaction, Governor Nikki Haley issued Executive Order 201209, creating the South Carolina Commission on Ethics Reform (the Reform
Commission) on October 18, 2012.8 The purpose of the Reform Commission
was, and still is, to restore South Carolinians' "confidence in, and respect for,
their institutions, including [the] government at all levels." 9 To that end, one of
the Reform Commission's major recommendations focused on independent
oversight of ethics law.10 An independent ethics commission that oversees the
South Carolina General Assembly would be better equipped to prevent "selfpolicing" than ethics committees consisting entirely of legislator members.11
Further, an independent oversight commission would bring South Carolina in
line with thirty-three other states in the Union.12
This Note examines the current ethical oversight procedures in South
Carolina government and the constitutional implications arising from such
procedures. Specifically, Part II examines South Carolina's statutorily created
State Ethics Commission and House and Senate Ethics Committees, as well as

ANN. § 4-2-6-2.5 (LexisNexis 2013); IOWA CODE ANN. § 68B.32A (West 2012); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 15.345 (West 2004); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 102.06 (LexisNexis 2007); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 42.17A.110 (West 2012). But see ALA. CODE § 36-25-4 (LexisNexis 2013);
ALASKA STAT. ANN. §§ 15.13.020, .045 (2012); ARK. CODE. ANN. § 7-6-217 (2011); CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 83115 (West 2005); COLO. CONST. art. XXIX, § 5; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-82 (West
2007); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 5809 (2003); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 112.322 (West 2008); GA. CODE
ANN. §21-5-6 (2008); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 84-31 (LexisNexis 2012); 5 ILL. COMP. STAT.
430/25-15 (2013); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-4119a-4119b (2000); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6.666
(LexisNexis 2013); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42:1134 (West 2006); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 1,
§ 1008 (West 1999); MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 15-205 (LexisNexis 2009); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 268B, § 3 (West 2008); MINN STAT. ANN. § 10A.02 (West 2005); MISS. CODE.
ANN. §25-4-21 (2010); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 105.955 (West 1997) (invalidatedby Legends Bank v.
State, 361 S.W.3d 383 (Mo. 2012) (en banc)); MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-37-111 (West 2013); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 49-14, 126 (2010); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 281A.280 (LexisNexis 2013); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 52:13D-21(f) (WEST 2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-B:3 (2009); N.Y. LEGIS. LAW § 80
(McKinney 1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 138A-10 (2013); OKLA. CONST. art. XXIX; OR. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 244.270 (2011); 65 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1107 (West 2010); R.I. CONST. art. III, § 8;
TENN. CODE ANN. § 3-6-105 (Supp. 2013); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 571.061 (West 2012); UTAH
JoINT LEG. R. 6-2-202 (2013); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 6B-2-2 (LexisNexis 2010); Wis. STAT. ANN
§ 19.48 (2012), 2007 Wis. ACT 1. The following states, on the other hand, do not have a state ethics
commission: Arizona, Idaho, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, South Dakota,
Vermont, Virginia, and Wyoming. See generally Ethics: State Ethics Commissions, NAT'L CONF.
OF
ST.
LEGISLATORS,
http://www.ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/ethicshome/state-ethicscommissions.aspx#ethics (last visited Mar. 31, 2014) (diagraming the current status of the state
ethics commissions in all fifty states, but failing to note the statutes that convey jurisdiction).
7.
S.C. COMM'N ON ETHICS REFORM, FINAL REPORT 1, 2 (Jan. 28, 2013), http://www.
governor.sc.gov/Documents/SC%/o20Commission%/o2Oon%/o2OEthics%/o20Reform%/o2OFinal%/o20Report
.pdf [hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT].
8.
Id. at 1.
9.
See id. at 2.
10. See id. at 13.
11. See Scoppe, supra note 4.
12. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7, at 13.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol65/iss4/7

2

Allen: Financial Disclosures and Fist-Fighting: Disorderly Behavior in t
GOVERNMENT ETHICS

2014]

771

their respective statutory schemes for handling ethics complaints under state law.
Next, Part III analyzes Rainey v. Haley1 3 in detail and discusses the implications
of the South Carolina Supreme Court's separation of powers discussion in the
opinion.14 Part IV examines the South Carolina Commission on Ethics Reform
and its recent report regarding ethics reform.' 5 Part V delves into the separation
of powers issue raised by the court in Rainey, particularly with respect to the
scope of "disorderly behavior"1 6 the breadth of which ultimately may resolve
the constitutional issue. Part V also looks to national case law for further
guidance regarding how to define disorderly behavior. Part VI concludes by
relating Rainey back to the current ethics reform debacle facing the General
Assembly, particularly focusing on the goal of creating a more independent form
of ethical oversight. Further, Part VI recommends a possible method of creating
such independent ethics oversight without violating the constitutional limits
outlined in Rainey.
II.

BACKGROUND ON ETHICAL OVERSIGHT IN THE SOUTH CAROLINA GENERAL
ASSEMBLY

It is important to distinguish between an ethics commission and an ethics
committee.1 Simply put, an ethics commission is generally more independent
of the legislature than an ethics committee.
A commission's members are
typically citizens or public officials from the executive branch appointed by the
governor or other leaders, whereas a committee is made up of state legislators. 19
Thus, a commission offers relatively independent external oversight compared to
a committee's internal oversight which entails members overseeing their peers
and ensuring that they comply with ethics laws.20 An ethics commission is
usually classified as part of the executive branch, while a committee is clearly
part of the legislative branch.21 Further, while a committee only has jurisdiction
over legislative bodies, a commission's jurisdiction usually reaches other
branches of the government sometimes extending from the executive branch to
22
23
the legislature.
All fifty states have some form of an ethics committee,
whereas only forty-one states have some form of an ethics commission.24

13.
14.

404 S.C. 320, 745 S.E.2d 81 (2013).
Id. at 326 27, 745 S.E.2d at 84.

15.

See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7, at 1.

16. S.C. CONST. art. III, § 12.
17. See Ethics Committees and Ethics Commissions: What's the Difference?, NAT'L CONF.
OF ST. LEGISLATURES, https://www.ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/ethicshome/committees-ampcommissions-whats-the-differenc.aspx (last visited Mar. 31, 2014).
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
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When the State Ethics Commission was created in 1975, it was responsible
for financial disclosure, campaign procedure, and ethical rules of conduct
pertaining to public officials. 5 At that time, the commission could publish
advisory opinions, receive ethics complaints, and conduct investigations and
hearings in response to those complaints.26 However, after years of little change,
and in response to the indictment of seventeen lawmakers on charges of
accepting bribes,27 the General Assembly enacted the Ethics, Government
Accountability, and Campaign Reform Act of 1991 (the State Ethics Act)28 to
restore public trust in governmental institutions and the political process.29 The
State Ethics Act increased the statutory penalties and expanded the size and
responsibilities of the Ethics Commission to include lobbyist registration and
disclosure.30
Currently, the State Ethics Commission exists in addition to separate House
and Senate Ethics Committees that provide ethical oversight to their respective
bodies of the General Assembly. 31 As such, the Ethics Commission has no
jurisdiction over the members or staff of the General Assembly; rather, it only
has jurisdiction over public officials, public members, or public employees32
primarily of the executive branch. The policy behind this separation appears to

23. Id. South Carolina has both a House Ethics Committee and a Senate Ethics Committee.
S.C. CODE ANN.§ 8-13-510 (Supp. 2013).
24. Id.
25. About Us, S.C. ST. ETHICS COMMISSION, SC.GOV, http://ethics.sc.gov/AboutUs/Pages/
index.aspx (last visited June 13, 2014).

26. Id.
27. See Beam, supra note 5.
28. S.C. CODE ANN.§§ 8-13-100 to -1520 (Supp. 2013).
29. See Guide to the South Carolina State Ethics Act, SPARTANBURG CMTY. COLL.,
http://ww2.sccsc.edu/SACS/reference/WebPages/EthicsGuide_208-8-03.pdf
(last updated Aug.,
2003); Beam, supra note 5.
30. S.C. ST. ETHICS COMMISSION, supra note 25; see also Vordman Carlisle Traywick, III,
Note, The South Carolina Primary Debacle: The Impact of Anderson v. South Carolina State
Election Commission and Vague State Election Laws on the 2012 Election, 64 S.C. L. REV. 931,
934-36 (2013) (outlining the ethics filing and disclosure requirements under the State Ethics Act).
31. S.C. CODE ANN. §§8-13-310, -510 (Supp. 2013).
32. The State Ethics Commission's jurisdiction is as follows:
[T]o initiate or receive complaints and make investigations ... upon complaint by an
individual, of an alleged violation of this chapter or Chapter 17 of Title 2 by a public
official, public member, or public employee except members or staff, including staff
elected to serve as officers of or candidates for the General Assembly unless otherwise
provided for under House or Senate rules.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-13-320(9) (Supp. 2013). A public employee is "a person employed by the
State, a county, a municipality, or a political subdivision thereof." Id. § 8-13-100(25). Public
member describes "an individual appointed to a noncompensated part-time position on a board,
commission, or council. Id. § 8-13-100(26). A public member does not lose this status by receiving
reimbursement of expenses or a per diem payment for services." Id. Public official is defined as
follows:
[A]n elected or appointed official of the State, a county, a municipality, or a political
subdivision thereof, including candidates for the office. "Public official" does not mean a
member of the judiciary except that for the purposes of campaign practices, campaign
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stem from article III, section 12 of the South Carolina constitution, which states
that "[e]ach house shall . . . punish its members for disorderly behavior .... 33
This provision has bolstered the argument that the state constitution requires
legislative self-policing and, to date, has provided a legal basis for the continued
separation of the Ethics Commission and legislative committees. 34 To that end,
"Courts have upheld state legislatures' right to set and impose their own ethical
rules, usually based on a separation of powers ruling." 35
The State Ethics Commission is composed of nine members appointed by
the Governor, upon the advice and consent of the General Assembly, on which
one member represents each of the seven congressional districts and two
members are appointed from the state at large. 36 Members serve five-year
terms.37 The Ethics Commission is considered an administrative agency under
the executive branch of government. 38 Members of the General Assembly and
other public officials are not eligible to serve on the commission. 39 In
comparison, the House and Senate Ethics Committees are each made up of six
members who are elected by the House and Senate, respectively.
The
committees' members serve terms that are coterminous with their terms in the
House or Senate.4 1
The current mission statement for the State Ethics Commission highlights its
responsibility for enforcing the State Ethics Act and "restoring public trust in
government."42 The Ethics Commission carries out this policy by ensuring
compliance with the requirements of the State Ethics Act. Nevertheless, the
main distinction between the Ethics Commission and the House and Senate

disclosure, and disclosure of economic interests, a probate judge is considered a public
official and must meet the requirements of this chapter.
Id. § 8-13-100(27).
33. S.C. CONST. art. III, § 12.
34. See Beam, supra note 5.
35. Ethics Committees & Commissions, NAT'L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.
ncsl.org/research/ethics/ethics-committees-commissions.aspx (last visited Mar. 5, 2014). This Note
does not delve into the debate regarding whether courts have jurisdiction over legislative ethical
violations; rather, this Note discusses the constitutionality of an independent ethics commission
exercising jurisdiction over the General Assembly.
36. S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-13-310(B) (Supp. 2013).
37. Id. § 8-13-310(C).
38. See Ethics: State Ethics Commissions, South Carolina, NAT'L CONF. OF ST.
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/ethics/state-ethics-commissions.aspx
(last visited
Mar. 5, 2014).
39. S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-13-310(B) (Supp. 2013).
40. Id. § 8-13-510.
41. Id.
42. Agency Mission Statement, S.C. ST. ETHICS COMMISSION, http://ethics.sc.gov/AboutUs/
Pages/Commission.aspx#agencymission (last visited Mar. 5, 2014).

43.

Id.
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Ethics Committees concerns which public officials fall within their respective
statutory jurisdictions. 44
A.

The Statutory Processfor Handling an Ethics Complaint

Under the State Ethics Act, the process by which the State Ethics
Commission conducts its investigations, inquiries, and hearings begins with the
commission accepting a verified complaint, in writing, that states the name of the
person alleged to have committed a violation and the particulars of that
violation. 45 Additionally, if the commission receives any information and finds
probable cause to believe that a violation has otherwise occurred, the
commission can file a verified complaint itself.46 Next, if the commission
determines that a complaint fails to allege sufficient facts to constitute a
violation, the commission will dismiss the complaint and strike it from public
47
record.
If the facts are sufficient, however, the commission will conduct an
investigation.48 The commission must order testimony and subpoena any
witnesses or materials evidencing proof of the alleged violation. 49 Unless the
respondent waives the right to confidentiality, all investigations, inquiries,
hearings, and accompanying documents must remain confidential until a finding
of probable cause or dismissal.50 Additionally, the Ethics Commission must
afford the subject of a complaint the opportunity to be heard and all other due
process rights.51 After the investigation, the commission must determine
52
whether probable cause exists.
If so, the commission may order a hearing
before a "panel of three commissioners, selected at random, to determine
whether a violation . .. has actually occurred"; if not, the commission will
dismiss the complaint.
Within sixty days of the conclusion of a hearing, the
panel must issue its determination in a "written decision with findings of fact and
conclusions of law." 54 The written decision may set forth an order requiring (1)

44. Compare S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-13-320(9) (listing public official, public member, or
public employee except members or staff, including staff elected to serve as officers of or
candidates for the General Assembly, unless otherwise provided for under House or Senate rules, as
those subject to complaint investigation), with id. § 8-13-530 (listing members, staff, and candidates
as subject to complaint investigation).
45. Id. § 8-13-320(10)(a).
46. Id. § 8-13-320(10)(d).
This type of verified complaint is filed upon a motion and
affirmative vote of the majority of the total membership of the commission. Id.
47. Id. § 8-13-320(10)(b). The executive director of the commission can also make this
determination. Id.
48. Id. § 8-13-320(10)(c).
The commission can request assistance from the appropriate
agencies if needed. Id. § 8-13-320(10)(e).
49. Id. § 8-13-320(10)(f).
50. Id. § 8-13-320(10)(g).
51. Id. § 8-13-320(10)(h). This includes the right to counsel. Id.
52. Id. § 8-13-320(10)(i).
53. Id.
54. Id. § 8-13-320(10)(k).
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the payment of a civil penalty; (2) the "forfeiture of gifts, receipts or profits, or
the value thereof, obtained" in the violation; or (3) some combination of the
two.5 5 Additionally, section 8-13-320(10)(k) outlines other actions the
commission may take with respect to its decision:
The commission panel, where appropriate, shall recommend disciplinary
or administrative action, or in the case of an alleged criminal violation,
refer the matter to the Attorney General for appropriate action. The
Attorney General may seek injunctive relief or may take other
appropriate action as necessary. In the case of a public employee, the
commission panel shall file a report to the administrative department
executive responsible for the activities of the employee.
If the
complaint is filed against an administrative department executive, the
commission panel shall refer the case to the Governor.56
An appeal process, during which the full commission reviews the decision
made by the panel, is also available so long as the respondent appeals within ten
days after service of an order, report, or recommendation.
Lastly, all actions
taken by the commission after a decision is rendered are matters of public
record.
The legislative committees follow a similar process, albeit more statutorily
simplified. When a complaint is filed, the respective committee determines
whether the facts are sufficient to constitute a violation.59 If so, the committee
promptly conducts a confidential investigation of the alleged violation in which
the committee may subpoena the attendance and testimony of witnesses, as well
as the production of pertinent documents.60 If probable cause exists to support
an alleged violation, the committee may "render an advisory opinion to the
respondent" that requires compliance.61 Should the respondent fail to comply
with the advisory opinion, the committee may convene a formal hearing on the
matter within thirty days.62 After the hearing, the committee makes a finding of
63
fact.
If "competent and substantial evidence" warrants, the committee may

55. Id. § 8-13-320(10)(1).
56. Id. § 8-13-320(10)(k).
57. Id. § 8-13-320(10)(m).
58. Id. § 8-13-320(10)(o).
59. Id. § 8-13-540(1).
60. Id. These actions are very similar to those of the Ethics Commission. Compare id. § 813-540(1) (providing that a sufficiently pled violation mandates prompt investigation with possible
subpoenas of witness and documents), with id. § 8-13-320(10)(c)-(h) (providing that a sufficiently
pled violation permits an investigation with possible subpoenas of witnesses and documents).
61. Id. § 8-13-540(1)(a).
62. Id. § 8-13-540(1)(b). If a hearing is set, the respondent has access to all of the documents
and matters procured by the committee and must be afforded all appropriate due process
protections. Id. § 8-13-540(2).
63. Id. § 8-13-540(3).
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take any combination of the following four actions: "administer a public or
private reprimand," determine that a "technical violation" has occurred,64
"recommend expulsion of the member," or refer the matter to the state attorney
general in the case of an alleged criminal violation. 65 Following the committee's
order, the respondent has ten days to appeal the action to the full legislative
body.66 If the respondent apjeals, the committee may only recommend an action
to the full legislative body. In these situations, the House or Senate has the
power to sustain or overrule the ethics committee's ruling or order other actions
consistent with the State Ethics Act.68 Accordingly, the respective legislative
body maintains final say over any ethical matter concerning its own members. 69
III. RAINEY V. HALEYAND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS ISSUE

Lawmakers have cited Rainey v. Haley to support the proposition that the
creation of a single ethics commission-independent of the General Assembly
to oversee all public officials would violate the separation of powers doctrine in
the South Carolina constitution.70 This Part first covers the facts leading up to
the South Carolina Supreme Court hearing the Rainey v. Haley case and then
analyzes the court's opinion in depth.
A.

Facts Leading to the South CarolinaSupreme Court HearingRainey v.
Haley

The controversy involving John Rainey and Governor Nikki Haley began
on November 17, 2011, when Rainey acting simply as a private citizen-filed
a complaint in the Richland County Court of Common Pleas seeking a
declaratory judgment that Haley violated certain provisions of the State Ethics
Act while serving in the South Carolina House of Representatives.72
Specifically, the complaint asked for a declaration regarding whether Haley
violated the law by committing the following actions:

64. A technical violation is typically unintentional and not made in an effort to violate the
Ethics Act. Id. § 8-13-1170. Technical violations must remain confidential unless the respondent
requests otherwise; they are penalized by a fine not exceeding fifty dollars. Id.
65. Id. § 8-13-540(3).
66. Id. § 8-13-540(4).
67. See id. § 8-13-550(A).
68. Id.
69. See id.; see also Scoppe, supra note 4 (discussing "self-policing" policies in the General
Assembly's ethics oversight).
70. See Beam, supra note 5.
71. Rainey is a citizen of and practicing attorney in South Carolina. John Rainey, PALMETTO
INST., http://www.palmettoinstitute.org/johnrainey.aspx (last visited Mar. 15, 2014).
72. Brief of Appellant at 6, Rainey v. Haley, 404 S.C. 320, 745 S.E.2d 81 (2013) (No. 2011CP-40-7854), 2012 WL 7677707, at *6.
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(1) lobbying a state agency in violation of S.C. Code Ann. § 2-17-15(A)
(Supp. 2011); (2) failing to disclose that her reason for recusing herself
from voting on legislation was because the legislation's beneficiary was
secretly paying her, in violation of S.C. Code Ann. § 8-13-700(B)
(Supp. 2010); (3) failing to abstain from a vote authorizing payment of
public money to a corporation paying her, in violation of S.C. Code
Ann. § 8-13-700(A) (Supp. 2010); (4) soliciting money from registered
lobbyists and lobbyists' principals for the benefit of her employer, in
violation of the same code section; and (5) concealing all of this activity
by making false and incomplete public disclosures required by the
Ethics Act, in violation of S.C. Code Ann. § 16-9-10(A)(2) (Supp.

2011).73
On March 21, 2012, the circuit court dismissed the action, finding that the
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and that Rainey lacked standing.74
Rainey, in line with the State Ethics Act, also filed the same complaint with
the House Ethics Committee two days before the circuit court dismissed the
case. In early May of 2012, several weeks after the circuit court's dismissal,
the House Ethics Committee-in line with the procedure outlined in section 813-540-found the allegations sufficient to warrant an investigation, but then
voted along party lines to clear Haley of the charges.76 After House Democrats
objected to the committee's contradictory outcome, however, the committee
reversed course and proceeded to hold a full hearing on the merits.
Nevertheless, after the hearing, the House Ethics Committee held that "Governor
Haley had not violated the law" and finalized the dismissal of Rainey's claims.
Subsequent to this jurisdictional ping-pong between the judiciary and General
Assembly, Rainey appealed the circuit court's decision and the South Carolina
Supreme Court agreed to hear the appeal.79

73. Id. The complaint also noted that the 2011 amendment to South Carolina Code section 813-700(B) "does not apply to the allegations" in the case. Id. at 6 n. 1.
74. See id. at 7.
75. Return Brief of Respondent at 2, Rainey v. Haley, 404 S.C. 320, 745 S.E.2d 81 (2013)
(No. 2011-CP-40-7854), 2012 WL 7677708, at *2.
76. Gina Smith, Reignited Haley Ethics Probe GrabsSpotlight, THE STATE, May 27, 2012, at
A3, available at http://www.thestate.com/2012/05/27/2291742/reignited-haley-ethics-probe-grabs.
html. Five Republicans voted to clear Haley also a Republican-of the charges, while one
Democrat voted against clearing Haley of the charges. See id.
77. Id.
78. Return Brief of Respondent, supranote 75.
79. See Rainey v. Haley, 404 S.C. 320, 322-23, 745 S.E.2d 81, 82 (2013). Thus, the case
moved back to the judicial branch. Id.
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The Real Issue(s) in Rainey v. Haley and the Court's Decision

The two issues on appeal were clearly stated in both Rainey's and Haley's
briefs to the supreme court: (1) whether courts in South Carolina have
jurisdiction to render declaratory judgments regarding the regulated conduct of a
member of the General Assembly who violates the law under the State Ethics
Act; and (2) whether a private citizen has standing to seek declaratory relief in
regard to the questionable ethical actions of the same member.80 Rainey also
claimed that an answer to the second issue would "provide future guidance in a
matter of great public importance[.]"
The factual merits of the case were
clearly not on appeal, however, because the circuit court never reached them.82
Additionally, the original briefs did not even mention the constitutional issue of
whether the court was violating separation of powers principles by hearing the
83
case.
The supreme court began its opinion by addressing the first issue whether
the court had jurisdiction to hear Rainey's case. 84 Looking to the "plain and
unambiguous" 5 language of the State Ethics Act, the court held that "[t]he
[General Assembly] has established a comprehensive statutory scheme for
regulating the behavior of elected officials, public employees, lobbyists, and
other individuals who present for public service." 86 To that end, the State Ethics
Commission and the Senate and House Ethics Committees were statutorily
created to enforce the Act.8 Additionally, the court looked to legislative intent
to determine "whether the [General Assembly] has given another entity [besides
the courts] exclusive jurisdiction ...." In that regard, "the relevant statute"
determines where jurisdiction lies.89 The court concluded that, under the State
Ethics Act, the General Assembly had conveyed exclusive jurisdiction upon the
House and Senate Ethics Committees "for the handling of ethics complaints
involving members of the General Assembly and their staff."90 Furthermore, for
the court to exercise jurisdiction otherwise would "contravene the clear language
of the State Ethics Act." 91

80. Brief of Appellant, supra note 72, at 5; Return Brief of Respondent, supranote 75, at 1.
81. Brief of Appellant, supra note 72, at 5.
82. See Rainey, 404 S.C. at 322-23, 745 S.E.2d at 82.
83. See generally Brief of Appellant, supra note 72 (failing to mention separation of powers);
Return Brief of Respondent, supra note 75 (failing to mention separation of powers).
84. Rainey, 404 S.C. at 323, 745 S.E.2d at 82.
85. Id. (quoting Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85, 533 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2000)).
86. Id. at 323 24, 745 S.E.2d at 83.
87. Id. at 324, 745 S.E.2d at 83.
88. Id. at 323, 745 S.E.2d at 83 (quoting Dema v. Tenet Physician Servs.-Hilton Head, Inc.,
383 S.C. 115, 121, 678 S.E.2d 430, 433 (2009)).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 324, 745 S.E.2d at 83. On the other hand, "[T]he State Ethics Commission is
generally responsible for the handling of ethical violations by most public officials and
employees ..... Id.
91. Id. at 327, 745 S.E.2d at 84.
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The supreme court continued its discussion of legislative intent and fortified
its position by citing the rule of construction "expressio unius est exclusio
alterius," or "to express or include one thing implies the exclusion of another, or
of the alternative." To that end, the court pointed to the single exception within
the State Ethics Act under which the judiciary has jurisdiction and "the circuit
court may receive and act on an ethics complaint, to the exclusion of the Ethics
Committee." 93 Because this is the only exception under the Act, the court
repeated its holding: "It is therefore clear the [General Assembly] intended the
respective Ethics Committee to otherwise have exclusive authority to hear
alleged ethics violations of its own members and staff."94
While the supreme court could have concluded its opinion with this subpart,
the court instead included a paragraph of dicta discussing separation of powers
and a constitutional issue. 95 Specifically, the court began by acknowledging
South Carolina's constitutional and judicial recognition and res ect for the
General Assembly's authority over the conduct of its own members.6 The court
supported this sentence by citing article III, sections 11 and 12 of the South
Carolina constitution.9 7 Section 11 grants each legislative house the authority to
judge the election returns and qualifications of its own members, 98 while section
12 provides that "[e]ach house shall choose its own officers, determine its rules
of procedure, punish its members for disorderly behavior, and, with the
concurrence of two-thirds, expel a member, but not a second time for the same
cause."99 Further, the supreme court cited two cases in which it had interpreted
only section 11 and held that that provision barred its jurisdiction.100 The court,

92. See id. at 325, 745 S.E.2d at 84 (quoting Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 86, 533 S.E.2d
578, 582 (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
93. Id. at 325, 745 S.E.2d at 83-84 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-13-530(4) (Supp. 2013)).
The exception has been dubbed the "fifty-day period" exception and provides the following:
No complaint may be accepted by the ethics committee concerning a member of or
candidate for the appropriate house during the fifty-day period before an election in
which the member or candidate is a candidate. During this fifty-day period, any person
may petition the court of common pleas alleging the violations complained of and
praying for appropriate relief by way of mandamus or injunction, or both. Within ten
days, a rule to show cause hearing must be held, and the court must either dismiss the
petition or direct that a mandamus order or an injunction, or both, be issued. A violation
of this chapter by a candidate during this fifty-day period must be considered to be an
irreparable injury for which no adequate remedy at law exists.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-13-530(4) (Supp. 2013).
94. Rainey, 404 S.C. at 325-26, 745 S.E.2d at 84.
95. Id. at 326-27, 745 S.E.2d at 84-85. This paragraph sparked controversy in later
legislative discussions regarding the creation of a single ethics commission. See Beam, supra note
5.
96. Rainey, 404 S.C. at 326, 745 S.E.2d at 84.
97. Id. (citing S.C. CONST. art. III, §§ 11, 12).
98. S.C. CONST. art. III, § 11.
99. Id. § 12 (emphasis added).
100. Rainey, 404 S.C. at 326-27, 745 S.E.2d at 84 (citing Stone v. Leatherman, 343 S.C. 484,
541 S.E.2d 241 (2001); Scott v. Thornton, 234 S.C. 19, 106 S.E.2d 446 (1959)).

Published by Scholar Commons, 2014

11

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 4 [2014], Art. 7
780

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 65: 769

however, did not provide a citation to a case in which it had interpreted section
12.101 The supreme court then concluded that "[c]onsequently, a court's exercise
of jurisdiction over [Rainey's] ethical complaint against Governor Haley would
not only contravene the clear language of the State Ethics Act, it would also
violate separation of powers." 02 This sentence was at the heart of the
controversy in later legislative discussions and is the focal point of this Note.103
In Rainey, the supreme court seemed to divide the statutory scheme for
handling ethics violations into three distinct steps: (1) receiving the complaint,
(2) handling and investigating the complaint under the statutory process, and (3)
resolving the complaint.104 While these three steps appear to delineate certain
jurisdictional boundaries, the question becomes where to draw the line to avoid
violating separation of powers. o0 The court looked to article III, section 12 in an
attempt to find constitutional guidance as to what powers are reserved for the
General Assembly. 106 The court appeared to interpret the language pertaining to
the ability to "punish its members for disorderly behavior" to include ethical
violations under the provisions of the State Ethics Act.10 7 The power to "punish"
appears to be synonymous with the court's third step of its delineation the
actual resolution of an ethics complaint.10 8 That being said, the court arguably
drew a line between the second step of handling a complaint and the third step of
resolving a complaint. 109 Thus, under Rainey, to give any entity besides the
House or Senate Ethics Committee the power to punish legislative members for
ethics violations would violate the South Carolina constitution's separation of
powers doctrine by depriving the General Assembly of its right to "punish its
members for disorderly behavior."110
IV. THE SOUTH CAROLINA COMMISSION ON ETHICS REFORM

Prior to the outcome of Rainey v. Haley, Governor Haley issued an
Executive Order in October of 2012 creating the South Carolina Commission on
Ethics Reform. 11 The Reform Commission published a report that "identifie[d]
those areas [in South Carolina ethics laws] which need immediate attention as

101. See id. at 326 27, 745 S.E.2d at 84.
102. Id. The court also held that, because it lacked jurisdiction to hear the case, it did not need
to address the remaining issue on appeal Rainey's standing as a private citizen. See id. at 327, 745
S.E.2d at 84 n.6.
103. See Beam, supra note 5.
104. See Rainey, 404 S.C. at 325, 745 S.E.2d at 83.
105. For example, it may be possible for an entity to receive and handle a complaint but not
resolve the complaint. See infra Part V.
106. Rainey, 404 S.C. at 326, 745 S.E.2d at 84.
107. See id. at 326 27, 745 S.E.2d at 84 (quoting S.C. CONST. art. III, § 12).
108. See id. (quoting S.C. CONST. art. III, § 12).
109. See infra Part V.
110. See Rainey, 404 S.C. at 326-27, 745 S.E.2d at 84 (quoting S.C. CONST. art. III, § 12).
111. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7, at 1.
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well as some which would stimulate the further examin ation [sic] of broad
categories of needed change."ll2 Of particular relevance to this Note is appendix
2, which addressed separation of powers and the State Ethics Commission's
jurisdiction. 113
Appendix 2 began by walking through the statutory provisions pertaining to
the State Ethics Commission and the House and Senate Ethics Committees.114
Particularly, it pointed out that the Ethics Commission is the "appropriate
supervisory office" for all public officials, "except for those members of or
candidates for the office of State Senator or State Representative."
The
Reform Commission referred to this statutory cutout as the "legislative
exception." 1 6 Later in appendix 2, the Reform Commission noted that "even the
section of the code establishing the three ethics bodies indicates that waiver of
the legislative exception may be accomplished by House or Senate rule .... 11
Thus, the Reform Commission appeared to take a less constrictive approach to
the statutory scheme of the State Ethics Act than the court in Rainey v. Haley.118
Also contrary to the court in Rainey, the Reform Commission opined that the
South Carolina constitution is silent on the issue of ethics oversight. 119
Accordingly, appendix 2 addressed "whether a constitutional change would be
necessary to remove the legislative exception to the jurisdiction of the South
Carolina Ethics Commission."l20 The Reform Commission specifically noted
the separation of powers doctrine in article I, section 8 of the South Carolina
constitution and the legislative power vested in the Senate and House of
Representatives by article III, section 1.121 The Reform Commission then
examined article III, section 12 in conjunction with section 13, while the court in

112. Id. at 2.
113. See id. at app. 2, at 28.
114. Id. at app. 2, at 28 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 8-13-100(2)(a), -310(A), -320(9), -510,
-530(3)).
115. Id. (quoting S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-13-100(2)(a)).
116. See id. (quoting S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-13-510).
117. Id. at app. 2, at 29 ("[T]o initiate or receive complaints and make investigations ... of an
alleged violation ... by a public official, public member, or public employee except members or
staff, including staff elected to serve as officers of or candidates for the General Assembly unless
otherwise provided for under House or Senate rules." (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-13-320(9)
(emphasis added)).
118. Compare id. (interpreting jurisdiction under the State Ethics Act), with Rainey v. Haley,
404 S.C. 320, 323-24, 745 S.E.2d 81, 83-84 (2013) (citations omitted) (interpreting jurisdiction
under the State Ethics Act).
119. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7, at 28. On the other hand, the Rainey court claimed
that disorderly behavior umbrellas ethical oversight. See Rainey, 404 S.C. at 326 27, 745 S.E.2d at
84.
120. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7, at 28. The issue is not whether the current language
in the South Carolina constitution obstructs jurisdiction, as discussed in Rainey. See Rainey, 404
S.C. at 326-27, 745 S.E.2d at 84.
121. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7, at 28-29 (quoting S.C. CONST. art. I, § 8; art. III,

§ 1).
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Rainey v. Haley considered it with section 11.122 This reading of the state
constitution accounts for the Reform Commission's view that disorderly
behavior from section 12 relates to the legislative arrest provision in section
13.123 The Reform Commission stated that "[t]he purpose of legislative arrest
appears to be to prevent disruption of legislative business." 24 Thus, by
"[r]eading the two sections together, the power to punish both members and nonmembers appears to be linked to the actual operation of the legislative
branch."l25 The Reform Commission adopted a narrow view of disorderly
behavior coupled with "threats of assault or arrest," referring to them as two of
the "only urgent impediments to the smooth functioning of legislative
business."l26 As such, "[n]either punitive section appears to contemplate a role
for sanctioning conduct not immediately threatening to legislative
proceedings."l27
Lastly, the Reform Commission cited a later section of the South Carolina
constitution concerning the actual removal of legislative officers, which states
"that legislators shall be removed for incapacity, misconduct or neglect of duty,
in such manner as may be provided by law, when no mode of trial or removal is
provided in this Constitution."l28 The Reform Commission seemed to include
this quotation, and the emphasis within, to show a distinction between conduct
immediately threatening to legislative proceedings-as dealt with under sections
12 and 13-and the mode of removal under the State Ethics Act for ethical
misconduct, which deals with conduct that is not immediately threatening.129
The Reform Commission began the conclusion of appendix 2 by pointing
out that "[a]ll bodies charged with investigating and punishing unethical conduct
by public officials in South Carolina are statutorily created."l30 Therefore, "If
each body in the General Assembly possessed inherent state constitutional
authority to investigate and sanction unethical behavior among its members as a
consequence of separation of powers and its ability to punish 'disorderly
behavior,' [then] statutory provisions for legislative ethics committees would be

122. Compare id. at 29 (examining article III, section 12 of the state constitution in
conjunction with section 13), with Rainey, 404 S.C. at 326, 745 S.E.2d at 84 (examining article III,
section 12 of the state constitution in conjunction with section 11). Note that the Reform
Commission's report came out prior to Rainey v. Haley. Compare COMMISSION REPORT, supra
note 7, at 2 (noting that the report was released in January of 2013), with Rainey, 404 S.C. at 320,
745 S.E.2d at 81 (noting that the case was decided in June of 2013).
123. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7, at 29.
124. Id.
125. Id. (emphasis added).
126. See id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
127. Id. (emphasis added).
128. Id. (quoting S.C. CONST. art. III, § 27) (internal quotation marks omitted).
129. Compare id. (discussing the mode of removal when the threat is not immediate), with
S.C. CONST. art. III, §§ 12-13 (discussing removal when an immediate threat to legislative
proceedings is present).
130. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7, at 29.
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unnecessary."l31 Because the state's ethics bodies were created by statute, the
General Assembly retains the power to modify the operations of these bodies by
amending the relevant sections of the South Carolina Code.132 The Reform
Commission pointed out that thirty-three of the forty states that have state ethics
commissions include their respective state legislatures within the jurisdiction of
their respective committees. 13 On the other hand, "South Carolina is one of six
states that have [sic] not granted this expanded jurisdiction."l34 Thus, the
Reform Commission concluded that a constitutional amendment would be
unnecessary to allow the State Ethics Commission to "subsume the jurisdiction
of the Senate and House Legislative Ethics Committees."1 35 Simply changing
the existing statute would be consistent with the legislative power that created
the ethical oversight bodies in the first place.136 Further, it "would pose no threat
to the separation of powers, as the punitive authority vested in the legislature
appears to be solely in service of maintaining the core legislative function"
which the Reform Commission concluded does not include ethical
misconduct. 137
V.

ANALYZING DISORDERLYBEHA VIOR AND THE BREADTH OF ITS MEANING

The discrepancy between the supreme court's analysis in Rainey and the
Reform Commission's conclusion in its report appears to turn on the scope of
disorderly behavior whether state legislators' ethical misconduct falls within
the exclusivity of article III, section 12 of the South Carolina constitution. While
not explicitly stated, both the Rainey court and the Reform Commission
addressed this issue, but reached their respective conclusions in different
manners. 138 First, the supreme court decided whether the judiciary has
jurisdiction to hear an ethics complaint under the State Ethics Act.1
In

131. Id. at 29 30 (quoting S.C. CONST. art III, § 12).
132. Id. at 30. The Reform Commission also noted that bills were introduced in both the
House and Senate during the 2011-2012 legislative session to expand the jurisdiction of the State
Ethics Commission to cover members of the General Assembly; however, neither bill made it out of
the committee stage. Id. (citing H.B. 4421 (S.C. 2012) and S.B. 1373 (S.C. 2012)).
133. Id.
134. Id.; see also sources cited supra note 6 (depicting which states have ethics commissions
and which states have ethics jurisdiction over their respective legislatures).
135. COMMISSION REPORT, supranote 7, at 30.

136. Id.
137. See id. at 29 30 (emphasis added). This conclusion obviously conflicts with the court's
ruling in Rainey insomuch as it deprives the General Assembly of its power to punish its
members but otherwise, it may be possible to grant jurisdiction to another entity to receive and
handle ethics complaints. See infra Part V.
138. Compare Rainey v. Haley, 404 S.C. 320, 325, 745 S.E.2d 81, 84 (2013) (discussing
whether the court can hear a legislative member's ethics violations), with COMMISSION REPORT,
supra note 2, at 30 (discussing whether the State Ethics Commission has jurisdiction over a
legislative member's nonpunitive violations).
139. Rainey, 404 S.C. at 324-25, 745 S.E.2d at 83-84 (citations omitted).
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comparison, the Reform Commission considered whether the State Ethics
Commission may independently from the General Assembly constitutionally
exercise jurisdiction over a legislative member's ethics violations under the State
Ethics Act.140 While these may appear to be relatively different analyses, both
interpreted article III, section 12-particularly disorderly behavior to
determine proper jurisdiction.141 Thus, these different interpretations raise the
obvious questions: What exactly does disorderly behavior mean, and does its
scope reach legislators' violations under the State Ethics Act?
One of the following three outcomes ultimately results, depending on the
scope of disorderly behavior:
1. Maintaining the current statutory scheme in the State Ethics Act,
under which the House and Senate Ethics Committees handle their
respective ethics cases involving members of the General Assembly
because such power falls exclusively within their jurisdiction under
article III, section 12 of the South Carolina constitution.
2.

Drawing a jurisdictional line within the statutory scheme for
processing ethics violations between the second step handling the
complaint under the statutory process-and the third step of
resolving the complaint and punishing the violator. This outcome
preserves all of the current ethics oversight entities, but also allows
for more independent ethics oversight.
The State Ethics
Commission would receive the complaint and handle the resulting
investigation and factfinding, while either the House or Senate
Ethics Committee would then resolve the complaint and punish its
members under article III, section 12.

3.

Amending the State Ethics Act to grant the State Ethics
Commission full jurisdiction over all public officials, including
legislators, because the scope of disorderly conduct does not reach
ethics violations and only refers to disruption of legislative
business.

Drudging through the following analysis is necessary to understand these
possible outcomes. The first two outcomes assume that the scope of disorderly
behavior includes ethical misconduct under the State Ethics Act. Under that
assumption, the South Carolina constitution appears to grant exclusive
jurisdiction to the respective legislative bodies and, in turn, their ethics

140. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7, at 30.
141. Compare id. at 29 (examining article III, section 12 of the state constitution in
conjunction with section 13), with Rainey, 404 S.C. at 326-27, 745 S.E.2d at 84 (examining article
III, section 12 of the state constitution in conjunction with section 11).
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committees.142 This train of thought, however, can reach either of the first two
outcomes. Looking back to Rainey v. Haley, the court divided the statutory
scheme of processing ethics violations under the State Ethics Act into three
distinct steps: (1) receiving the complaint, (2) handling and investigating the
complaint under the statutory process, and (3) resolving the complaint.143
Because the statutory scheme contemplates all three steps, the supreme court
held that the General Assembly "intended the respective Ethics Committees to
have exclusive authority to hear the alleged ethics violations of its own members
and staff."144 In an attempt to further support this holding, the court later
brought up article III, section 12, in which the court implied that the General
Assembly's "punish[ing] [of] its own members for disorderly behavior" includes
the statutorily granted power to punish under the State Ethics Act.145 The action
of actually punishing members of the General Assembly appears to fall under the
third step in the statutory scheme, concerning resolution of the complaint. 146
Thus, the first two outcomes presented above arise out of the creation of a
jurisdictional line between the second and third step in the statutory scheme of
handling ethics complaints. 147 Without the jurisdictional line, one of the
legislative entities the House or Senate Ethics Committee-must handle the
entire process.148 Alternatively, if the line is drawn, a separate entity the State
Ethics Commission-could possibly handle receiving the complaint and
conducting the investigation and hearing, but then pass along the complaint to
the legislative committee to handle the punitive resolution step. The latter
solution allows independent ethics oversight without depriving the General
Assembly of its constitutional right to punish its members for disorderly
behavior.149 This outcome also appears consistent with the court's holding in
Rainey because it maintains the General Assembly's sole authority over the
conduct of its own members and, thus, preserves the separation of powers.150
The third outcome assumes that the scope of disorderly behavior does not
include ethical misconduct. Thus, an independent entity such as the State

142. This line of reasoning stems from Rainey, although the court did not directly address the
State Ethics Commission's jurisdiction there. See Rainey, 404 S.C. at 326-27, 745 S.E.2d at 84.
143. See id. at 325, 745 S.E.2d at 83.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 326, 745 S.E.2d at 84.
146. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-13-540(3)(a)-(d) (codifying the alternative actions the ethics
committee shall take after hearing an ethics complaint and determining its findings of fact). As
these options appear to be the only solution after hearing a complaint, it seems logical that they
constitute the act of punishing. See WEBSTER'S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1567 (Random House,
2d ed. 2001) (defining punish as "inflict[ing] a penalty for (an offense, fault, etc.)").
147. See discussionsupra Part III.B (discussing the court's division of the statutory scheme of
handling ethics violations under the State Ethics Act).
148. See Rainey, 404 S.C. at 324, 745 S.E.2d at 83.
149. See generally S.C. CONST. art. III, § 12 (bestowing the constitutional power to punish
members for disorderly behavior on each house of the South Carolina General Assembly); S.C.
CONST. art. I, § 8 (creating South Carolina's separation of powers doctrine).
150. See Rainey, 404 S.C. at 326, 745 S.E.2d at 84-85.
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Ethics Commission-could arguably exercise jurisdiction over the entire process
of handling ethics violations of any public official, including legislators. Under
this outcome, and in line with the Reform Commission's report, the General
Assembly could simply amend the State Ethics Act to grant jurisdiction to the
State Ethics Commission in an effort to provide "extra-legislative ethics
oversight."1 5 1 That being said, this third outcome may conflict with the Rainey
opinion.152 As previously discussed in this Note, the court undoubtedly implied
that the scope of disorderly behavior under article III, section 12-in some
capacity not defined reaches ethics violations under the State Ethics Act. 153
Thus, under Rainey, the General Assembly likely cannot delegate the entire
process of handling ethics violations because article III, section 12 apparently
grants some rights exclusively to the General Assembly. 154
Nevertheless, because the court in Rainey did not explicitly define disorderly
behavior, the following discussion looks to several cases from other jurisdictions
to better understand this term of art.
A.

Guidanceon Defining Disorderly Behavior

Unlike the South Carolina Supreme Court in Rainey v. Haley, the Reform
Commission attempted to find some guidance from other jurisdictions on the
definition of disorderly behavior.15 5 In its report, the Reform Commission
looked to State v. Gregorio,156 a New Jersey case that "addresse[d] issues raised
by non-legislative prosecution of ethics violations [of a state senator] as possible
violations of the separation of powers doctrine and legislative rule-making
authority." 15 In that case, the defendant allegedly failed to report certain income

151. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7, at 30.
152. See Rainey, 404 S.C. at 326, 745 S.E.2d at 84-85.
153. See supra Part III.B. The concurrence in Rainey, however, did mention several bills that
were introduced in the House and Senate last year to bring the General Assembly within the
jurisdiction of the State Ethics Commission. See Rainey, 404 S.C. at 328 n.8, 745 S.E.2d at 85 n.8
(Hearn, J., concurring). Nevertheless, these bills did not make it out of the committee stages. See
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7, at 30 (citing H.B. 4421 (S.C. 2012) and S.B. 1373 (S.C.
2012)).
154. See Rainey, 404 S.C. at 326, 745 S.E.2d at 84-85.
155. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7, at 29.
156. 451 A.2d 980 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1982).
157. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7, at 30 (citing Gregario, 451 A.2d 980). In its report,
the Reform Commission approached this case to better define disorderly behavior, but also in a
broader context to suggest that the judiciary has jurisdiction over ethics violations-contrary to the
holding in Rainey v. Haley, which came out after the Reform Commission's report. Compare id. at
30-31 (citations omitted) (rejecting the argument that the executive branch has no power to enforce
a rule requiring financial disclosure statements), with Rainey, 404 S.C. at 327, 745 S.E.2d at 84
(holding that "ethics investigations regarding legislative members and staff can only be performed
by the [General Assembly]"). However, this Note is solely focused on defining disorderlybehavior
in regard to the constitutionality of an independent ethics commission

and examines Gregorio in

that specific context.
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in a filing required under New Jersey's conflict of interest law, 1s an ethics
violation similar in nature to a violation under the South Carolina State Ethics
Act. 159 However, unlike South Carolina, New Jersey has a single independent
ethics commission the Joint Legislative Committee on Ethical Standards
which functions under the executive branch and has statutorily granted
jurisdiction over the legislature. 160 The defendant argued that this executive
branch oversight and subsequent prosecution in state court violated the state's
separation of powers doctrine. 161 New Jersey's separation of powers doctrine is
very similar to that found in the South Carolina constitution. 162 New Jersey's
doctrine states that "[t]he powers of the government shall be divided among
three distinct branches, the legislative, executive, and judicial. No person or
persons belonging to or constituting one branch shall exercise any of the powers
properly belonging to either of the others, except as expressly provided in this
Constitution."l63 Likewise, according to South Carolina's doctrine, "In the
government of this State, the legislative, executive, and judicial powers of the
government shall be forever separate and distinct from each other, and no person
or persons exercising the functions of one of said departments shall assume or
discharge the duties of any other."1 64
The New Jersey court dismissed the defendant's argument, reasoning that
the separation of powers doctrine is not "to be construed as creating three
mutually exclusive watertight compartments."l65
To that end, "criminal
prosecution in such a case plainly advances the legislative goal."1 66 The court
compared such "concurrent jurisdiction" to the executive prosecution of an
errant attorney, even though the exclusive authority to supervise and discipline
attorneys rests with the New Jersey Supreme Court.167 The court explained that
"[t]o accept [the] defendant's theory, one must subscribe to the view that the
Legislature intended to make its members super-citizens shielded from criminal

158. Gregorio,451 A.2d at 982.
159. Compare N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:28-7 (enumerating state law regarding deceptive acts in
manipulation of public records or information), with S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 8-13-1120 through -1520
(Supp. 2013) (enumerating South Carolina's State Ethics Act regarding election campaign
management).
160. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:13D-22.
161. Gregorio,451 A.2d at 982.
162. Compare N.J. CONST. art. III, para. 1 (enumerating New Jersey's separation of powers
doctrine), with S.C. CONST. art. I, § 8 (enumerating South Carolina's separation of powers
doctrine).
163. N.J. CONST. art. III, para. 1.
164. S.C. CONST. art. I, § 8.
165. Gregorio, 451 A.2d at 984 (quoting Massett Bldg. Co. v. Bennett, 71 A.2d 327, 329
(1950)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
166. Id. That goal is "to combat official corruption and advance public confidence in its
governmental institutions." Id. at 983.
167. Id. at 984 (citing N.J. CONST. art. VI, § 2, para. 3 (1947)). This argument would be
equally applicable in South Carolina because the situation is the same regarding attorney discipline.
See S.C. APP. CT. R. 413.
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prosecution by sheer virtue of their public office."1 68 The court finalized its
dismissal of the defendant's arguments by holding that "[t]he power of the
Legislature to enforce its own code of ethics, to assess monetary penalties and to
pursue further action, including expulsion of a member, does not divest the
Executive Branch of the authority and obligation to prosecute criminal
conduct."l 69 Further, such power cannot "be construed to encroach upon that
sphere of responsibility constitutionally dedicated to the judiciary." 170
Another possibly more important part of Gregorio addressed the New Jersey
state legislature's amicus curiae argument that "the requirement of financial
disclosure statements constitutes a legislative rule beyond the power of the
executive to enforce." 1 This argument relies on the fact that New Jersey's
ethics code was derived from constitutionally granted rulemaking authority; as
such, only the legislature can enforce it.172 New Jersey's constitutional provision
states that "[e]ach house shall choose its own officers, determine the rules of its
proceedings, and punish its members for disorderly behavior."1 73 The court
rejected the amicus argument and summarized its holding as follows:
The short answer to the argument advanced by amicus is that the code of
ethics and hence the requirement that financial disclosure statements be
filed with the joint committee were adopted pursuant to the Conflicts of
Interest Law, not by virtue of the constitutional authority of the
Legislature to make rules and punish members for disorderly behavior.
The constitutional rule-making power of the Legislature is generally
exercised in the context of establishing standards to provide for the
orderly and efficient conduct of legislative proceedings. The code of
ethics provision requiring the filing of financial statements stands upon
an entirely different footing . .

.

.

[T]he Legislature made a clear

procedural election when it adopted a code of ethics and characterized it
as an agency rule. It cannot be said that the code was adopted pursuant
to a power demonstrably committed to the Legislative Branch of
government by the text of the Constitution. Simply stated, it was
adopted pursuant to the Conflicts of Interest Law, not by virtue of a rule

168. Gregorio, 451 A.2d at 985 (stating further that "[i]n such a case, his activities would
constitute a violation of the legislative code of ethics and, hence, criminal penalties would be
barred").
169. Id.
170. Id. (citing N.J. CONST. art. V, § 1, para. 1 (1947)).
171. Id. at 988.
172. See id. (citing N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 4, para. 3 (1947)).
173. N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 4, para. 3 (emphasis added). This provision is almost identical to
South Carolina's article III, section 12, which states that "[e]ach house shall choose its own officers,
determine its rules of procedure, punish its members for disorderly behavior, and, with the
concurrence of two-thirds, expel a member, but not a second time for the same cause." S.C. CONST.
art. III, § 12.
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promulgated pursuant to the constitutional responsibility of the
Legislature to establish its own procedures.174
The court's holding explicitly clarified that the purpose of the constitutional
rulemaking provision is for the orderly and efficient conduct of legislative
proceedings, and that it does not relate to enforcement of the state ethics code.
The South Carolina Reform Commission ageed with this contention by citing
the New Jersey court's holding in its report.1 6
United States v. Rose1 provides further guidance in defining disorderly
behavior.178 In that case, a congressman was found to have violated the Ethics in
Government Act of 1978179 (the Federal Ethics Act) after being investigated by
the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Standards of Official
Conduct.so The same Committee concluded the matter by issuing a public
rebuke for the violations.181 Despite the Committee's conclusion, the Department
of Justice (DOJ) opened an investigation to determine whether the congressman
had "knowingly and willfully" violated the ethics law.182 Subsequent to the
DOJ's action, the House Committee informed the DOJ that it had already
concluded that the congressman did not knowingly and willfully violate the
Federal Ethics Act. 183 The DOJ, however, proceeded with its action and this
lawsuit ensued. 18 4 The portion of the opinion relevant to this Note discussed
whether "the constitutional provision granting each House the power to regulate
the conduct of its Members . . . bars the DOJ [under the separation of powers

doctrine] from bringing an action charging 'knowing and willful violations' of
the [Federal] Ethics Act after the Committee has determined that the violations
were inadvertent."1 8 5 Interestingly and in contrast to South Carolina law the
U.S. House of Representatives took its ethics law further by adopting the full
text of the Federal Ethics Act into the House Rules.186 The D.C. Circuit held that
this action allowed the House to enforce the Federal Ethics Act "pursuant to its

174. Gregorio,451 A.2d at 988-89 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
175. See id.
176. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7, at 32.
177. 28 F.3d 181 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
178. Id. at 183-84 (citing H.R. REP. No. 100-526, pt. VI, at 25 (1988)) (listing a
Congressman's multiple violations of both the House Rules and the Ethics Act).
179. Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (1978).
180. Rose, 28 F.3d at 184 (citing H.R. REP. No. 100-526, pt. VI, at 25).
181. Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 100-526, at 26).
182. Id.
183. See id.
184. Id. at 185.
185. Id. at 189-90 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2) ("Each House may determine the Rules
of its Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly Behavior, and, with the Concurrence of two
thirds, expel a Member.").
186. Id. at 190 (citing House Rule XLIV, H.R. Res. 1099, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 114 CONG.
REc. 8777 (1968)).
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constitutional power to discipline its Members." 1 8 Despite this further action by
the House, however, the court still held that "by codifying these requirements in
a statute, Congress has empowered the executive and judicial branches to
enforce them; in bringing this action, then, the DOJ was fulfilling its
constitutional responsibilities, not encroaching on Congress's." 1
Thus, the
court stated that it "[did] not think the DOJ's action against Congressman Rose
offend[ed] the separation of powers doctrine."1 89
This holding is very pertinent to defining disorderly behavior because it
seems to imply that, by incorporating the Federal Ethics Act into the House
Rules, enforcement of that Act came within the scope of the House's power to
"punish its Members for disorderly Behavior" under Article I, Section 5, Clause
2 of the U.S. Constitution. 190 More importantly, however, the inclusion of the
Federal Ethics Act into the House Rules did not bar concurrent executive
enforcement of the Act because the Act was already codified prior to its
incorporation into the House Rules. 191
Lastly, the most important aspect of the D.C. Circuit's holding in Rose is its
implication that Article I, Section 5, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitutionparticularly disorderly behavior refers only to the actual operation of the
legislative proceedings.192 This proposition would support the South Carolina
Reform Commission's conclusion that the almost identical provision in the state
constitution does not "contemplate a role for sanctioning conduct not
immediately threatening to legislative proceedings."93 Only by incorporating
the Federal Ethics Act into the House Rules did the U.S. House of
Representatives bring ethics violations within its scope of power under the U.S.
Constitution's rulemaking provision.194 Prior to such incorporation, ethics
violations under the Federal Ethics Act were likely outside the scope of
disorderly behavior.
Lastly, the Commission on Ethics v. Hardyl95 case presents yet another twist
in the task of defining disorderly behavior. In Hardy, the Supreme Court of
Nevada addressed an appeal for a permanent injunction after the Nevada
Commission on Ethics instituted administrative proceedings against a state
senator. 196 The proceedings followed a complaint of ethics violations that
involved the senator's failure to adequately disclose an alleged conflict of

187. Id. (referring to the "punish its Members for disorderly Behavior" provision in U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2).
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. See id.; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (creating the constitutional power for each
House of Congress to determine the "Rules of its Proceedings").
191. United States v. Rose, 28 F.3d 181, 190 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
192. See id.
193. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7, at 29 (emphasis added).
194. See Rose, 28 F.3d at 190; U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 5, cl. 2.
195. 212 P.3d 1098 (Nev. 2009).
196. Id. at 1102.
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interest regarding a senate bill, as well as his failure to abstain from the voting on
that bill. 197 Particularly, the court considered whether such a proceeding violated
the Nevada separation of powers doctrine by delegating a constitutionally
committed function of the legislature to another branch of government. 198 The
court began its discussion by reviewing Nevada's separation of powers doctrine,
which prohibits one branch of government from impinging on the powers of
another. 199 Next, the court considered article 4, section 6 of the Nevada
constitution:
Each House shall judge of the qualifications, elections and returns of its
own members, choose its own officers (except the President of the
Senate), determine the rules of its proceedings and may punish its
members for disorderly conduct, and with the concurrence of two thirds
of all the members elected, expel a member.200
The court stated that "[t]his provision expressly grants the authority to
discipline legislators for disorderly conduct to the individual houses of the
Legislature, thus the power to discipline legislators for disorderly conduct is a
function constitutionally committed to each house of the Legislature." 20 1
Further, "the Legislature may not delegate th[is] constitutionally committed
authority."202 This conclusion left the court to decide "[w]hat legislative actions
are subject to discipline for disorderly conduct under this constitutional
provision," and particularly, whether the power to discipline for disorderly
conduct applied to the senator's ethics violations.203 Addressing these issues, the
court reached the following conclusion:
[T]o the extent that a legislator's actions are undertaken in the course of
the legislator's participation in, or conduct of, a core legislative
function, any discipline for purported disorderly conduct in the course of
engaging in these core function activities is a function constitutionally

197. Id.
198. Id. at 1100. In particular, the court determined that the Nevada Commission on Ethics is
an executive branch agency and, thus, part of another branch of government that is separate from
the legislature. Id. at 1108.
199. Id. at 1103-04 (citing Heller v. Legislature, 93 P.3d 746, 753 (Nev. 2004)). Specifically,
article 3, section 1(1) of the Nevada constitution states the following:
The powers of the Government of the State of Nevada shall be divided into three separate
departments, ... the Legislative, ... the Executive and the Judicial; and no persons
charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall
exercise any functions, appertaining to either of the others, except in the cases expressly
directed or permitted in this constitution.
NEV. CONST. art. III, § 1.
200. NEV. CONST. art. IV, § 6.
201. Hardy, 212 P.3d at 1104.
202. Id. at 1105.
203. Id. (citing NEV. CONST. art. IV, § 6).
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committed to each legislative house with regard to its members that
cannot be delegated to another branch of government. 204
The court was quick to note that the legislature can delegate the power to
discipline conduct related to noncore legislative functions. 2
In this case,
however, the court held that voting on legislation is a core legislative function. 206
As such, "the authority to discipline legislators for disorderly conduct allegedly
committed in the course of voting on legislation ... cannot be delegated to
another branch of the government."207 The rule from Hardy is relatively
expansive in the sense that the punishment of any disorderly conduct related to
the core function activities, such as the disclosure necessary to vote or abstain
from voting on legislation, cannot be delegated to another branch of
government. 208
The decision in Hardy likely creates another step of analysis when
considering what constitutes disorderly behavior: determining whether the
misconduct was undertaken in the course of a "core legislative function." 209 if
so, under Hardy, any punishment for that misconduct falls within the category of
a "function constitutionally committed to each house of the Legislature [that]
cannot be delegated to another branch of govemment."210 This rule would
disrupt the South Carolina Reform Commission's conclusion that article III,
section 12 of the South Carolina constitution only deals with conduct linked to
the actual operation of legislative proceedings.211
Instead, in determining
whether conduct falls under the protection of article III, section 12, one would
have to first determine whether such conduct relates to a "core legislative
function."212 If so, only the South Carolina General Assembly would have the
constitutional power to punish its members for such conduct. 213

204. Id. at 1106 (emphasis added) (citing Brady v. Dean, 790 A.2d 428, 431-33 (Vt. 2001)).
205. See id. at 1106 n.9 (emphasis added). The court expanded on this by stating, "Using the
ethics laws as an example, such proceedings could include discipline for legislators who use
governmental time, property, equipment, or other facilities for nongovernmental purposes (NRS
281A.400(8)), bid or enter into governmental contracts (NRS 281A.430), or accept or receive an
honorarium (NRS 281A.5 10)." Id.
206. Id. at 1106.
207. Id.
208. See id. at 1107 (citing Heller v. Legislature, 93 P.3d 746, 753 (Nev. 2004); Brady v.
Dean, 790 A.2d 428, 431-33 (Vt. 2001)).
209. See id. at 1106 (citing Brady, 790 A.2d at 431-33 (Vt. 2001)).
210. Id. (citing Brady, 790 A.2d at 432 (Vt. 2001)). This, of course, assumes that the state in
which such analysis is taking place has a similar constitutional provision to those in Nevada and
South Carolina dealing with the "punishment of disorderly behavior." See NEV. CONST. art. IV, §
6; S.C. CONST. art. III, § 12.
211. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7, at 29.

212. See Hardy, 212 P.3d at 1106.
213. See S.C. CONST. art. III,
§ 12.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS IN LIGHT OF RAINEY V. HALEY

South Carolina is bound by the court's ruling in Rainey.214 Thus, the
resolution-or punishment of ethics violations under the State Ethics Act
appears to currently fall within the General Assembly's exclusive jurisdiction. 215
The Rainey court, however, did not explicitly define disorderly behavior and
only implied that punishing members of the General Assembly for disorderly
behavior includes the resolution of ethics violations.216 Accordingly, the
conclusions reached by the South Carolina Ethics Reform Commission are not
entirely invalid. The Reform Commission made a useful observation: the South
Carolina Code clearly states that jurisdiction can be granted to the State Ethics
217
Commission if the House or Senate rules are amended.
Also, and perhaps
more importantly, the notion that disorderly behavior only refers to conduct
affecting legislative proceedings may be found in case law outside of appendix 2
in the Reform Commission's report.
The Gregorio and Rose cases support the
idea that conduct not immediately threatening to a legislative function-such as
ethics violations under the State Ethics Act-does not fall within the scope of
disorderly behavior.219 The Hardy case also provides support for the distinction
between conduct that is immediately threatening and conduct that is not but
analyzes the issue from the perspective of whether the conduct affects a core
legislative function.220
Going forward, the South Carolina Supreme Court may need to reconsider
its ruling in Rainey and more clearly explain its interpretation of disorderly
behavior.221 The cases discussed above, however, provide keen insight into how
other courts have dealt with the issue of whether disorderly behavior includes
ethics violations.222 If the South Carolina General Assembly adopts the State

214. See Rainey v. Haley, 404 S.C. 320, 326 27 745 S.E.2d 81, 84 (2013) (holding that to
give any entity besides the House and Senate Ethics Committees the power to punish legislative
members for ethics violations would violate the separation of powers by depriving the General
Assembly of its right to "punish its members for disorderly behavior").
215. Id. at 326, 745 S.E.2d at 84-85 (citations omitted).
216. Id. at 326, 745 S.E.2d at 84.
217. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7, at 29 ("[T]o initiate or receive complaints and
make investigations ... of an alleged violation ... by a public official, public member, or public
employee except members or staff, including staff elected to serve as officers of or candidates for
the General Assembly unless otherwise provided for under House or Senate rules." (emphasis
added) (quoting S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-13-320(9) (Supp. 2013))).
218. See, e.g., United States v. Rose, 28 F.3d 181, 183 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (discussing the notion
that disorderly behavior only refers to conduct affecting legislative proceedings); Comm'n on Ethics
v. Hardy, 212 P.3d 1098, 1106 (Nev. 2009) (citing Brady v. Dean, 790 A.2d 428, 432 (Vt. 2001))
(discussing the notion that disorderly behavior only refers to conduct affecting legislative
proceedings); State v. Gregorio, 451 A.2d 980, 989 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1982) (discussing the
notion that disorderly behavior only refers to conduct affecting legislative proceedings).
219. See Gregorio,451 A.2d at 989; Rose, 28 F.3d at 190.
220. See Hardy, 212 P.3d at 1106 (citing Brady, 790 A.2d at 432-33 (Vt. 2001)).
221. See Rainey v. Haley, 404 S.C. 320, 327 745 S.E.2d 81, 84-85 (2013).
222. See supra Part V.A.
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Ethics Act into its rules of proceedings, then disorderly behavior would include
any violations under the Act.223 Alternatively, perhaps only punishment for
violations involving core legislative functions-such as voting on bills will
come under the exclusive jurisdiction of the General Assembly granted by article
III, section 12.224
If the goal is truly to restore trust in government, then South Carolina must
find a solution to provide more independent oversight of the ethics laws enforced
against state legislators. The most viable option would likely involve a situation
in which an independent entity the State Ethics Commission-can receive
ethics complaints and handle investigations and factfinding, while either the
House or Senate Ethics Committee would then resolve the complaints and
punish the respondents accordingly.225 This solution draws a jurisdictional line
that preserves the constitutional right of the General Assembly to punish its own
members for ethics violations, but also creates a system of independent oversight
that instills more trust in the state's public officials.22 6 Regardless, after the
Rainey decision, the implementation of this solution will require further
clarification from the South Carolina Supreme Court on the concept of
disorderly behavior. Only then can South Carolina move forward and restore
trust in its government.
Noah Glen Allen

223. See, e.g., Rose, 28 F.3d at 183 (holding that adopting the Federal Ethics Act into the U.S.
House Rules allowed the House to enforce the Federal Ethics Act "pursuant to its constitutional
power to discipline its Members").
224. See, e.g., Hardy, 212 P.3d at 1106 (citing Brady, 790 A.2d at 432-33) (holding that
punishment of any disorderly conduct related to the core fimction activities of the legislature cannot
be delegated to another branch of the government).
225. See supra Part V.
226. See supra Part V.
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